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To update a famous old statistic: a political leader in a developing country is almost twice as likely
to lose office in the 6 months following a currency crash as otherwise.   This difference, which is
highly significant statistically, holds regardless whether the devaluation takes place in the context
of an IMF program.   Why are devaluations so costly?    Many of the currency crises of the last ten
years have been associated with output loss.    Is this, as alleged, because of excessive reliance on
raising the interest rate as a policy response?   More likely it is because of contractionary effects of
devaluation.  There are various possible contractionary effects of devaluation, but it is appropriate
that the balance sheet effect receives the most emphasis.   Passthrough from exchange rate changes
to import prices in developing countries is not the problem:  this coefficient fell in the 1990s, as a
look at some narrowly defined products shows.  Rather, balance sheets are the problem.   How can
countries mitigate the fall in output resulting from the balance sheet effect in crises?   In the shorter
term, adjusting promptly after inflows cease is better than procrastinating by shifting to short-term
dollar debt, which raises the costliness of the devaluation when it finally comes.  In the longer term,
greater openness to trade reduces vulnerability to both sudden stops and currency crashes.
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December 2004 is the tenth anniversary of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994.  In 
retrospect, this crisis ushered in an eight-year series of highly visible devaluations in 
emerging markets, most of which proved highly costly to the countries involved.   These 
currency crashes are the theme of my lecture. 
Accordingly, I will begin by invoking neither Mundell nor Fleming, but another 
article from three decades ago: Richard Cooper’s  “Currency Devaluation in Developing 
Countries.”    This was one of the few major papers from that period to deal explicitly 
with the macroeconomics of developing countries.  The weight of our attention has over 
the last decade or two shifted increasingly away from rich countries and toward 
developing countries, whether judged by the caseload of the staff at the International 
Monetary Fund or by working papers turned out by scholars in the field of International 
Finance and Macroeconomics.   In part this reflects the extent to which lower- and 
middle-income countries have become increasingly integrated into world financial 
markets.   Twenty years ago, for example, one would not have wanted to apply the 
Mundell-Fleming model’s insights regarding international capital mobility to developing 
countries, because they didn’t have much (capital mobility).   Indeed I don’t think the 
phrase emerging markets even existed then.   But after the liberalizations and capital 
inflows of the early 1990s -- and the crises of the late 1990s -- we are applying to 
developing countries a wide variety of models and tools that were originally created with   3 
rich countries in mind.   And we have as well created some new models and tools to try to 
capture what is different about developing countries.   
 
1. Political Costs of Devaluation  
I wish to take as our starting point a widely cited statistic from Cooper (1971, p. 
28) that, in the aftermath of devaluations, nearly 30 per cent of governments fell within 
12 months, as opposed to 14 per cent in a contemporaneous control group.   This is an 
impressive fact, as demonstrated by the frequency with which other authors still cite it 33 
years later.   AI did a citation count reveals that:   Cooper’s article has received 84 
citations, with no downward trend over time -- not as high as the two seminal papers that 
constituted the Mundell-Fleming model and thus gave this lecture its name, but still very 
healthy for a paper written so long ago.
1   So I expect to garner a lot of citations myself 
by updating Cooper’s calculation ! 
 
1.1 Updating a statistic on leaders’ loss of office 
Cooper took anything over 10% to be a devaluation episode.   But the world 
changed in the 1970s and 1980s, and depreciations of that magnitude have become 
commonplace.  For a high inflation country, one would not want to say that a new 
currency crisis occurs every month.     So I use the following definition:
2 
·  The devaluation must be at least 25% (on a cumulative 12-month basis) 
                                                 
1 This paper was originally presented as the Fifth Annual Mundell-Fleming lecture.  
Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) received 319 and 257 citations respectively over the 
same period, 1972-2003.   This probably understates the contribution of the Mundell-
Fleming model:   many discussions of the model cite other works, or none at all.     
2 The same as that in Frankel and Rose (1996).   4 
·  The devaluation must represent an acceleration of at least 10 percentage 
points, relative to the rate of depreciation in the 12 months before that. 
·  It must have been at least three years since the last currency crisis. 
 
By these criteria, looking at a sample of 103 developing countries over the period 
1971-2003, we found 188 currency crashes.   Of these the identity of the country’s chief 
executive changed within 12 months of the devaluation 27% of the time.  The standard of 
comparison that we use normally is all other 12-month periods:  the leader changed 
20.5% of the time normally.   Thus devaluation increases by an estimated 32% the 
probability of the executive losing his or her job.   The difference is only statistically 
significant at the 13% level.
3   However, it may be that countries that tend generally to 
instability are overrepresented in the crisis group, so that political turnover is more 
common in this group even if not necessarily the result of currency crises.  If we narrow 
the standard of non-devaluation comparison periods to the set of countries that have 
experienced a currency crash at some point during the sample period, on the grounds that 
these are more comparable to the crisis episodes, we find that the increase in job loss 
among devaluers now becomes statistically significant at almost 1% level.
4 
We then narrowed the window to a half-year.    Now the chief executive lost 
office 19.1 % of the time, as opposed to 11.6 % of the time otherwise.  In other words, 
the currency crash increases the probability of a change in the top leadership within the 
following 6 months by 1.7 times.  This time the difference is statistically significant not 
                                                 
3  Appendix 1 A.  The source for the identity of the president, prime minister, premier, or 
other chief executive, is http://rulers.org. 
4 Appendix 1 B.   5 
only at the 10% or 1% levels, but at the 0.5% level as well, regardless whether the entire 
set of countries is used as the standard of comparison. 
We also looked at whether the finance minister or central bank governor – 
whoever held the office of the country’s governor of the IMF -- lost his or her job.   Here, 
even using the longer 12-month window (and even with only five years of data: 1995-
99), the effect is statistically significant.   In the year following a currency crash, the 
occupant of this position changed 58.3 per cent of the time.   In other years during this 
period the rate of turnover was 35.8%.    So by this measure the finance minister or CB 
governor was 63% more likely to lose office.  The difference is highly significant 
statistically (at the .001 level).
5 
When we segregate countries according to three income levels, we find that the 
phenomenon chiefly comes from middle income countries.   Within the class of poor 
countries, the increase in turnover of the leader is not statistically significant; and among 
rich countries there were no cases of a leader losing office within a year of a devaluation. 
We also tried segregating countries according to three kinds of political structure: 
presidential democracy, parliamentary democracy, and non-democracy.    Our 
expectation was that we would find that the effect of devaluation on leadership turnover 
would be greater among parliamentary democracies than among presidential 
democracies.   The logic was that, in any given year, the latter might not have a scheduled 
election, or if they did, a term limitation might prohibit the incumbent from running for 
                                                 
5 Appendix 1, Part C.     6 
re-election.    We found, instead that the job loss rate was much higher and more 
significant in the case of devaluations occurring in presidential democracies.
6 
  We examined whether an equally large loss of reserves results in job loss as often 
as a devaluation.  Such episodes also tend to be unpleasant (often implying monetary 
contraction and recession, e.g., Argentina in 1995, 1999).  A, but apparently they do not 
carry the same political costs, however:  Their effect on leaders’ job loss was not 
significant. 
What is it about devaluation that carries such big political costs?  How is it that a 
strong ruler like Indonesia’s Suharto can easily weather 32 years of political, military, 
ethnic, and environmental challenges, only to succumb to a currency crisis? 
 
1.2. Possible sources of political costs of devaluation 
Currency crises have often been accompanied by sharp recessions.  Thus an 
obvious interpretation, which we will consider further, is that leaders are punished by 
their constituents when the performance of the economy is poor.   But before proceeding 
on the assumption that the loss of ministerial jobs is a reflection of unemployment and 
depressed activity throughout the economy, let us consider the possibility that the costs of 
a devaluation may be more political than economic.  First, there is the possibility that 
elections cause currency crashes rather than the other way around.    Second, it could be 
that IMF programs or other austerity programs are unpopular in general, and that the 
devaluations are an incidental aspect of this.     Third, it could be that the leaders in 
                                                 
6  The breakdown by income and democratic structure is given in Parts F, G and H of 
Appendix 1.   7 
question had made public promises in advance not to devalue, and that they were 
punished for breaking these promises regardless of subsequent economic performance. 
What do I mean by the first possibility, that elections cause devaluations rather 
than the other way around?    It is striking in how many of the major crises of the 1990s, 
even though trouble began during the run-up to a major regularly scheduled national 
election, the worst speculative attack and currency crash came soon after the election.  
This describes Mexico 1994, Korea 1997, and Brazil 1998-99.  In an earlier era, one 
would have guessed that election-motivated macroeconomic expansion -- the famous 
political business cycle -- explains the need for a subsequent devaluation.   But that 
explanation does not fit the experience of the 1990s as well.   Macroeconomic expansion 
in these election campaigns was limited.
7  
A better explanation is that devaluation is politically costly to leaders, and so in 
an election year they try to postpone it -- whether to get re-elected,
8 or so that the crash 
comes on their successors’ watch rather than theirs, or out of the hope that something will 
turn up to improve the balance of payments.
9   A related hypothesis is that because a 
devaluation uses up scarce political capital, it is more likely to be undertaken by a new 
leader with a strong mandate, especially in a visible crisis, and especially if he can blame 
it on his predecessor.   Edwards (1994, Table 5) reports that devaluations occur 
                                                 
7 The political business cycle literature observes that politicians are sometimes able to 
fool voters by aggressive macroeconomic expansion preceding the election, with costs 
borne later.  But Brender and Drazen (2004) argue that is primarily a phenomenon found 
in countries that have only recently made the transition to democracy.  Voters eventually 
learn. 
8  On governments’ incentive to postpone devaluations until after elections, see Stein and 
Streb (1998, 1999). 
9  On governments’ incentive to postpone devaluations until after elections, see Stein and 
Streb (1998, 1999).   8 
disproportionately often during the first two years after a transfer of government:  77.3% 
of devaluations among presidential democracies (i.e., those with pre-scheduled elections), 
and 70.0 % among parliamentary democracies.  This is a topic worth exploring, but not 
here:  my calculations about the frequency with which ministers lose their jobs in the year 
after a devaluation were careful to start the clock the day after the devaluation, so that 
cases where the devaluation came soon after an electoral change are not included in the 
statistics. 
The second possibility I mentioned is that devaluations are acting as a proxy for 
unpopular IMF austerity programs or other broad reform packages.    IMF-associated 
austerity programs have often resulted in popular unrest.  For example, riots following 
food-subsidy cutbacks contributed to the overthrow of President Nimeiri of Sudan in 
1985.
10   
One can test the proposition that devaluations are acting as a proxy for unpopular 
IMF austerity programs by conditioning our previous calculation on the adoption of IMF 
programs.   We created a dummy variable to represent cases where an IMF program was 
initiated within 3 months on either side of the devaluation.
11    The IMF program variable 
does not seem to raise the frequency of leader job loss, relative to devaluations that did 
not involve an IMF program.   Thus it is not surprising that conditioning on the IMF 
                                                 
10 Edwards and Santaella (1993) report nine cases of post-devaluation coup attempts, in a 
study that looks at the role of IMF presence along with various measures of political 
instability in determining whether devaluations during the period 1950-1971 were 
economically successful.
   Lora and Olivera (2004) find that voters punish presidents for 
pro-market policies and for increases in the rate of inflation, but not for exchange rate 
policies per se.     For an earlier summary of the political consequences of IMF-type 
austerity programs, see Bienen and Gersovitz (1985). 
11 Whether Standby Agreement, or other.  See Appendix 2 for list with dates.  Part G of 
Appendix 1 reports the results.   9 
dummy variable has no discernible effect on the frequency of leader turnover:  21.05% of 
the time for the cases with an IMF program, or 21.92% of the time for the ones without.   
In both cases, it is similar to the overall rate of job loss following devaluations (19.05%) 
in the complete sample, and is still almost double the 11.6% rate in normal times. 
That leaves the third non-economic explanation, that the ministers in question 
have made public promises in advance not to devalue, and that they feel it necessary to 
resign or are punished for breaking these promises, regardless of subsequent economic 
performance. In many cases the commitment to the peg is explicitly reaffirmed by top 
policy-makers and political leaders in the months immediately prior to the devaluation.    
Perhaps such ill-fated promises are originally made because the minister is duplicitous, or 
at least is ignorant of the speculative pressures he or she is up against.  More likely they 
are too attached to the peg psychologically to let go;  many of the currency crashes of the 
1990s occurred in countries where governments had a lot invested in the peg, because 
exchange-rate-based stabilizations earlier had been the successful and popular means of 
ending a 1980s cycle of high inflation, even hyperinflation.    
But I think that a still better way to view the public commitments may be as 
sincere expressions of a strong desire to maintain the peg.   The ministers may realize that 
events could force the abandonment of the exchange rate policy, if speculative pressures 
accelerate and it develops that reserves are about to run out, leaving little other option.   
And they may realize that making an explicit statement beforehand increases the chances 
that they will have to resign if and when the peg is abandoned.   But making the promise 
is a way of buying a bit of credibility, and buying some time. Specifically it is a device   10 
for signaling that their determination to hold the line on the currency is so strong that they 
are willing to risk sacrificing their jobs.    
We selected a sub-sample of 24 cases out of our total set of currency crashes.   
We chose roughly equal numbers of cases with and without subsequent premier 
changes.
12   We searched local newspapers for the 30 days preceding the devaluation for 
statements by government officials that could be construed as commitments not to 
devalue.    We included assurances even if the language did not read as explicit or 
ironclad, because these are so often interpreted as promises.
13     
The sample size is small.   But we found that when some member of the 
government (chief executive, finance minister, or central bank governor) had given 
assurances that there would be no devaluation, and a devaluation did subsequently occur, 
the probability that the chief executive would lose his or her job within 12 months was 
2/3.    Where no such assurances were reported, the frequency of job loss was only 7/18, 
despite the devaluation.  In other words, whatever the credibility benefits of the promise 
ex ante, it almost doubles the likelihood that the leader loses office ex post.    If we use 
the 6-month horizon, then the relative effect is even stronger: the leader is more than 
twice as likely to be out on the street if the government had made a previous commitment 
than if it had remained quiet (.50 vs. .19).    If we consider only those cases where the 
chief executive himself is the one to have given the assurances, then the job loss rate 
                                                 
12  The other major criteria were that the country in question be represented by 
comprehensive microfiche files in Harvard’s Widener Library of past newspapers, and 
that the languages of those newspapers be either English, Spanish, Korean, or Arabic, the 
languages spoken by the research assistants working on this project.     Appendices 3 and 
4 offer details of these cases. 
13  In at least one case, Syria, the newspapers appear to have been so lacking in candor 
regarding the relevant exchange rate that they did not even bring up the subject.    11 
becomes 100%.   But there were only two such cases, out of 24.  Usually the dangerous 
task of going on the record is delegated to a cabinet member.  (Details are reported in 
Appendix 3 for the 12-month horizon, and Appendix 4 for the 6-month horizon.) 
Despite this suggestive outcome, to the effect that the “broken promise” factor 
does indeed matter, it seems unlikely that this is the sole reason for devaluations to result 
in turnover at the top.  After all, even among those cases where our newspaper search 
turned up no record of assurances in the month preceding the devaluation -- either from 
the leader, finance minister, or central bank governor – 220% of the leaders lost office 
within 6 months of the devaluation anyway, and 393% within 12 months [tables in 
Appendices 3a and 4a].[M1]   This is well above the 11.6%  or 20.5% rates, respectively, 
of job loss in normal times.  Evidently the economic effects of devaluation also play an 
important role. 
 
2. Does Devaluation Necessarily Mean Loss of Output? 
As already noted, the most obvious interpretation of why devaluations are so 
often associated with high political costs is that they are accompanied by painful 
recessions.
14   But why?   After all, devaluations are supposed to increase 
competitiveness, increase production and exports of tradable goods, reduce imports, and 
thereby boost the trade balance, GDP, and employment.   Hence the story of the British 
                                                 
14 Another possibility is that, even if there is no negative effect on GDP in the aggregate, 
the redistributional effects could be politically costly to the leaders.   For example, a 
devaluation in an African country may benefit small rural coffee and cocoa farmers 
because the price of their product is determined on world markets, but they tend to have 
less political power than urban residents, who may be hurt by the devaluation.  The 
problem with this theory is that there are so many examples that go the other way, where 
the producers of the tradable products (agricultural, mineral, or manufactured) tend to 
have more political power than the producers of nontraded goods.   12 
Chancellor of the Exchequer “singing in the bath” after the 1992 devaluation of the 
pound.    Apparently developing countries are different, or at least emerging market 
countries are.   Figuring out why may amount to figuring out what aspect of these 
countries most requires us to modify the macroeconomic models standardly applied to 
advanced economies. 
One can argue that simultaneous monetary and fiscal austerity are the true causes 
of these declines in economic activity.   Or banking failures, or the sudden stop in foreign 
lending itself.  But this misses what, to me, is a key point.   According to the standard 
textbook theories, when a country faces a sudden stop in capital flows, there exists some 
optimal combination of expenditure-reducing policies (monetary or fiscal contraction) 
and expenditure switching policies (devaluation) that should adjust to external balance 
(the new balance of payments constraint), without necessarily sacrificing internal balance 
(i.e., without a recession).  Why did all the countries in the East Asia crisis of 1997-98 
suffer a sharp loss in output growth regardless of their mix of devaluation and 
expenditure-reduction?   The expansionary effect of the devaluation is supposed to be 
able to make up for whatever contraction comes from other sources. 
Consider a graphical representation with the interest rate and exchange rate (price 
of foreign currency) on the axes, as illustrated in Figure 1a.  To satisfy external balance, 
there is an inverse tradeoff between the two instruments.  A devaluation and an increase 
in the interest rate are each ways of improving the trade balance -- the latter by reducing 
expenditure -- and so the more you have of one the less you need of the other.  (If 
external balance is defined as equilibrium in the overall balance of payments, including 
the capital account along with the trade balance, the relationship is still downward-  13 
sloping, since a devaluation and an increase in the interest rate are both ways of making 
domestic assets more attractive to global investors.)   
To satisfy internal balance, the tradeoff is traditionally considered to be upward-
sloping.  An increase in the interest rate reduces the domestic demand for domestic 
goods, while a devaluation increases the net foreign demand for domestic goods;   if you 
have more of one, you also need more of the other, to prevent excess supply or excess 
demand.  
The existence of two independent instruments implies the possibility of attaining 
both targets simultaneously, at the intersection of the internal and external balance 
schedule.  In the aftermath of an adverse shock in the foreign sector, for example, the 
right combination of devaluation and monetary contraction will restore balance of 
payments equilibrium while maintaining real economic growth. 
This is not always the way things actually work.
15  By now we have had enough 
experience with crises in emerging markets that the traditional framework needs to be 
modified.  The simple generalization seems to be that most developing countries that are 
hit by financial crises go into recession.  The reduction in income is the only way of 
quickly generating the improvement in the trade balance that is the necessary counterpart 
to the increased reluctance of international investors to lend.  External balance is a 
jealous mistress that can be satisfied only if internal balance is left to go wanting. 
 
                                                 
15 Paul Krugman, “Latin America’s Swan Song,” 1998, at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/swansong.html.   14 
Critics of the IMF say that the recessions are the result of Fund policies, 
specifically the insistence on austerity in country rescue programs.
 16    Some can be 
interpreted as arguing that there should have been more expenditure switching, and less 
expenditure reduction; that the mix of a lower interest rate combined with a bigger 
devaluation would successfully maintain internal balance.  But many of the devaluations 
in East Asia and elsewhere were very large as it was. The critics often make the point that 
high interest rates are not in practice as attractive to foreign investors as the Mundell-
Fleming model, for example, would suggest, because they carry increased probability of 
default.  This is true.  But in my view it is not the most important correction in the 
traditional framework.  Even if interest rates do not have as big a positive effect on the 
capital account as our earlier models of high financial integration suggested, so that the 
graphical relationship may be flatter, I believe that the sign of the effect is still the same.  
Even if higher interest rates have no effect at all on capital inflows, their effect on the 
balance of payments still goes the same way, owing to the effect on spending.  One 
cannot normally attract many investors by lowering interest rates.  Therefore the external 
balance line still slopes downward.  Claims that high rates are damaging to the real 
economy willfully ignore the lack of an alternative, if the external balance constraint is to 
be met. 
Where the traditional framework needs most to be modified is the relationship 
giving internal balance, not that giving external balance.  By now the evidence seems 
strong that devaluation is contractionary, at least in the first year, and perhaps in the 
second as well.  We have long been aware of various potential contractionary effects of 
                                                 
16 E.g., Radelet and Sachs (1998); and Furman and Stiglitz (1998).   15 
devaluation in developing countries.   The same 1971 Cooper article that tallied job 
losses among ministers also listed six ways in which devaluation could be contractionary.   
By 1990, a total of ten such effects had been identified in textbooks.
17    
Until the currency crashes of the 1990s, a mainstream view had been that any 
negative effects from a devaluation were before long offset by the positive effect of 
stimulus to net exports, so that by the second year, when the latter had gathered strength, 
the overall effect on output had turned positive.
18   Now however, one must judge the 
negative effects stronger than we thought, and the positive effects weaker.  Calvo and 
Reinhart (2001), for example, calculate that exports do not increase at all after a 
devaluation, but rather are down for the first 8 months.  The export side, at least, was 
supposed to be unambiguously positive.  Apparently production is sometimes derailed by 
corporate financial distress, absence of trade credit, and increased costs of imported 
inputs, even when the production is for the purpose of export.   Imports fall sharply; 
indeed crisis-impacted countries have for this reason experienced sharp increases in their 
trade balances beginning as soon as two or three months after the crisis.   But this is 
clearly a response to the unavailability of finance and collapse of income and spending, 
not to relative prices.  In other words, it is expenditure-reduction, not expenditure 
switching. 
If devaluation is contractionary, then the internal balance line slopes down, not up 
(as illustrated in Figure 1b).  Moreover the slope may be disturbingly similar to the slope 
of the external balance line.  It is hard to see where the two intersect, if they intersect at 
                                                 
17 E.g., the 5
th through 9
th editions of Ronald Caves, Jeffrey Frankel, and Ronald Jones, 
World Trade and Payments, 2002. 
18 Edwards (1986) and Kamin (1988).      16 
all.  This means that it is hard to see what combination of policy instruments, if any, can 
simultaneously satisfy both internal and external balance, after an adverse shock has 
shifted the latter outward.  The depressing conclusion is that there is no escape from 
recession.  All policy instruments work via reduction in income in the short run -- 
devaluation, fiscal contraction, and monetary contraction.  Even structural policy reform, 
such as insisting that bad banks go under, may have a negative effect on economic 
activity in the short run. 
  Is the targets-and-instruments framework then no longer useful?  I think that the 
framework is still relevant during the period after a terms-of-trade shock or reversal in 
capital flows (as reflected in a peaking of reserves), but before the speculative attack hits 
(as reflected in a very sharp devaluation, loss in reserves, or increase in interest rates).  It 
can be hard to identify such an interval, especially at the time.  But I have in mind the 
interval of a year or so preceding December 2001 in Argentina, July 1997 in East Asia, 
December 1994 in Mexico.  I call this the period of procrastination, for reasons that will 
become clear below.    
 
3. Why is Devaluation Often Contractionary? 
Of the many possible contractionary effects of devaluation that have been 
theorized, which are in fact responsible for the recessionary currency crashes of the 
1990s?     Several of the most important contractionary effects of an increase in the 
exchange are hypothesized to work through a corresponding increase in the domestic 
price of imports, or of some larger set of goods.    Indeed, rapid passthrough of exchange 
rate changes to the prices of traded goods is the defining assumption of the “small open   17 
economy model,” which has always been thought to apply fairly well to emerging market 
countries.   The contractionary effect would then follow, in any of several ways:  the 
higher prices of traded goods would, for example, reduce real money balances or real 
wages of workers
19, or increase costs to producers in the non-traded goods sector.
20 
These mechanisms were not much in evidence in the currency crashes of the 
1990s.    The reason is that the devaluations were not passed through to prices for higher 
imports, for domestic competing goods, or to the CPI in the way that the small open 
economy model had led us to believe.    The failure of high inflation to materialize in 
East Asia after the 1997-98 devaluations, or even in Argentina after the 2001 devaluation, 
was good news -- a surprise that perhaps to some extent compensated for the 
unexpectedly sharp recessions.   But it calls for some investigation. 
 
3.1  The decline in exchange rate passthrough in developing countries 
Conventional wisdom has long been that passthrough is slower or less complete in 
large industrialized countries than in small developing countries.    A number of authors 
have pointed out a further decline during the 1990s in the passthrough coefficient among 
industrialized countries.   But most of the many econometric studies of passthrough, even 
those that examine a recent decline in the passthrough coefficient, have focused on prices 
of imports into industrialized countries, rather than into developing countries.   Taylor 
(2001) proposed that a decline in passthrough of exchange rate changes into the CPI in 
                                                 
19  Diaz-Alejandro (1963) pointed to a transfer of income from (low-saving) urban 
workers who consume traded goods, to (high-saving) rich owners of agricultural land 
20  Increased costs to producers of non-traded goods could come from either higher costs 
of imported inputs like oil, or higher labor costs if wages are indexed to the cost of living 
(e.g., Corbo, 1985, in the context of Chile in 1981).   18 
the 1990s was due to a lower inflationary environment, and looked at US data.  Gagnon 
and Ihrig (2004) extended this claim to a sample of 11 industrialized countries.  Otani, 
Shiratsuka, and Shirota (2003) found a similar decline in passthrough for imports into 
Japan.  Campa and Goldberg (2001) again found a decline in the coefficient in the 1990s, 
but attributed it to changing commodity composition more than to a less inflationary 
environment.
21 Their data set again consists solely of industrialized countries.   
Only a few studies include lower-income countries.  Choudhri and Hakura (2001) 
extend to a sample of 71, including developing countries, the finding that a low-inflation 
environment reduced passthrough to the CPI in the 1990s.  Borensztein and De Gregorio 
(1999) and Goldfajn and Werlang (2000), study the low passthrough of recent large 
devaluations in developing countries.
22   But these are all studies of influences on 
aggregate price measures, the CPI in particular, not on import prices.  Few studies 
concentrate on imports of specific goods into developing countries.  The difference is 
important because effects on price indices vs. prices of specific imports are really two 
distinct conceptions of the word “passthrough.”  It is even more important because, as in 
the rich country context, some authors have claimed that what appears to be slow or 
incomplete passthrough in developing countries can really be attributed to changes in 
composition with regard to product varieties. 
23    
                                                 
21  It has been pointed out at least since Knetter (1993) that differences in passthrough 
coefficients could be attributable to differences in the composition of the price index, 
rather than to differences in passthrough that would show up for narrowly-defined 
commodities.   
22  References to some further studies are given in Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005). 
23 Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2002) attribute the low observed passthrough in 
general price indices to the disappearance from consumption of newly expensive import 
goods, and their replacement in the indices by inferior local substitutes.  No doubt this is 
indeed a relevant effect.   19 
Table 1, taken from Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005), reports estimates for 
passthrough to prices of narrowly defined retail imports into 76 countries.   Notice, first, 
confirmation of  the conventional wisdom that passthrough has historically been higher in 
developing countries than in rich countries.   As of the beginning of our sample period, 
1990, the coefficient was .3 for rich countries and .8 for developing countries, with the 
difference highly significant statistically.  (Figure 3 illustrates the numbers on average 
during our sample period.)  That these numbers fall below 1.0 cannot be attributed to 
compositional effects, as the 8 goods are defined very narrowly: a roll of color film, a 
carton of Marlboro cigarettes, an issue of Time magazine, a bottle of Cointreau, etc.     
Theories of slow or incomplete passthrough can be divided according to what sort 
of arbitrage barrier they posit as blocking the enforcement of the law of one price: 
barriers to international trade such as tariffs and transportation costs, or local costs of 
distribution and retail.   The results in Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005) furnish support 
for both sorts of theories.   Bilateral distance is a statistically significant determinant of 
the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) term;  that is, higher transport costs lead to 
slower passthrough to import prices.   At the same time, a higher wage – the largest 
component of local distribution and retail costs – also shows up as a significant negative 
determinant of the passthrough coefficient.
24   Both determinants apply to rich and poor 
                                                 
24 Table 1 applies only to prices of retail imports.   But results for prices at other stages, 
reported in Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005), supply further evidence that both kinds of 
arbitrage barriers are operative.   On the one hand, passthrough is incomplete even for the 
prices of these imported commodities at dockside, which suggests that local distribution 
costs cannot be the only barrier to arbitrage – transport costs, tariffs, and other trade 
barriers must matter as well.   In support of this conclusion, distance has an important 
effect, either reducing or slowing passthrough, at all four stages -- dockside imports, 
retail, competitors’ prices, and the CPI.     On the other hand, passthrough behavior for 
retail imports is more like behavior for local substitutes than it is like imports at the dock,   20 
countries alike.  Size does not appear as a determinant in most of our results:  small 
countries do not experience more passthrough than large, a very surprising finding in 
light of “pricing to market” theories (i.e., price discrimination by sellers).   
 For present purposes,  the important point is that the passthrough coefficient fell 
significantly in the course of the 1990s, and that the speed of decline was twice as fast 
among developing countries as among rich (.051 per year as compared to .025).
25   The 
speed of passthrough, which is estimated in the form of an ECM term, also shows a 
significant downward trend for developing countries (not for rich).  
One might wonder if this estimated decline in the passthrough coefficient during 
the 1990s is an indirect reflection of an asymmetry whereby passthrough of depreciation 
is greater than passthrough of appreciation, or a threshold effect whereby large 
devaluations result in proportionately less passthrough.   We have found in extensions 
that the answer is  “no;”  the trend remains even after controlling for the big 
devaluations.
26    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
which suggests that tariffs and transportation costs cannot be the only barrier to arbitrage 
– local distribution matters too.  In support of this conclusion, higher wages have a strong 
negative effect on passthrough to the local competitors’ prices and the CPI. 
25 Taken literally, the estimated trend is strong enough to bring the passthrough 
coefficient to zero by 2006.   This conclusion may to some extent be an artifact of the 
assumption of a linear trend that should not be extrapolated.    But when we try a 
different functional form that allows the effect of time to asymptote to zero (the 
reciprocal of time), we get a similar result:   the passthrough coefficient falls most of the 
way to zero during the sample period. 
26   The threshold effect, while significant, goes the wrong way: changes in the exchange 
rate above 25% are found to have proportionately larger passthrough effects, not smaller.   
We did find strong evidence of asymmetry.  In fact we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
appreciation is not passed through at all, suggesting downward price rigidity.    This is an 
interesting finding.  But the significant downward trend in the passthrough coefficient 
remains.   21 
One would expect passthrough to prices of domestically produced goods or the 
general CPI to be (even) lower than to prices of imports.  Our paper also reports results 
for other local price measures, and this is indeed the pattern they show. (See Figure 2).   
Tariffs and distance both contribute significantly to low passthrough to the CPI.  But 
passthrough to prices of local substitutes and to the CPI both show the same downward 
trends over the sample period as passthrough to import prices.   The difference in 
coefficient trends between poor and rich countries is even greater for passthrough to the 
CPI than it is for import prices.   This is important, in the present context, because most 
of the potential contractionary effects of devaluation require that passthrough extend 
beyond import prices alone, to include also passthrough to locally produced goods or the 
CPI. 
What can we say about the reasons for the decline in passthrough?  As noted, one 
hypothesis proposed by others is declining long-run inflation rates.  This factor turns out 
to be particularly relevant in the case of explaining the downward trend in passthrough to 
developing country CPIs.    
Another possible explanation for the trend is rising labor costs in retail and 
distribution.    We find that wages are a significant determinant of passthrough.  The 
wage hypothesis turns out to be particularly relevant in the case of explaining the 
downward trends in passthrough either to the prices of local substitutes or to the CPI 
(reported in Frankel, Parsley and Wei, 2005).   Controlling for wages reverses an 
estimated tendency for passthrough to the CPI to decline as country income per capita 
grows.  A possible interpretation is that the role of distribution and retail costs in pricing   22 
to market becomes increasingly important as countries achieve higher incomes, owing to 
the Balassa-Samuelson-Baumol effect. 
In any case, most of the decline in passthrough remains unexplained, despite the 
many contributing factors we estimated.
27   The strongest conclusion is simply that 
incomplete passthrough is another respect in which developing countries have become a 
bit more like rich countries, for whatever reason. 
 
3.2 The balance sheet effect 
If the contractionary effects that rely on passthrough to higher goods prices do not  
explain the recessions that followed many of the 1990s devaluations, then what does?  On 
the list of contractionary channels, the balance sheet effect is the one that has dominated 
in terms of attention from researchers, and I think appropriately so.  Domestic banks and 
firms had large debts denominated in foreign currencies, particularly in dollars.  They , 
which they might have been able to service these debts at the previous exchange rate, but 
which they had trouble servicing after the price of foreign exchange had gone up sharply.   
The results were lay-offs and bankruptcies.
28 
                                                 
27  Another variable we looked at is long-run exchange rate variability.  Here the 
influence could go either way.    On the one hand, if exchange rate variability is another 
sign of monetary instability, like the inflation rate, it might be thought to contribute to 
faster passthrough; there is some support for this effect in the case of import prices in 
developing countries.  On the other hand Froot and Kemperer (1989), Krugman (1989) 
and Taylor (2000) have suggested that when exchange rate fluctuations are largely 
transitory, passthrough is lower, an effect that is supported in the case of passthrough to 
the CPI in developing countries.  Indeed, an increase in exchange rate variability in the 
late 1990s can apparently explain fully the significant downward trend in the speed of 
adjustment of the CPI.   
28 The analytical literature on balance sheet effects and output contraction includes, but is 
not limited to: Aghion, Banerjee and Bacchetta (2000), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco 
(2003, 2004), Chang and Velasco (1999), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002),   23 
There is plenty of evidence of the output cost associated with the balance sheet 
effect.   Looking at the experience of the 1990s, Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri and Roubini 
(2002) show that countries entering a crisis with high levels of foreign debt tend to 
experience large real exchange rate overshooting (devaluation in addition to the long run 
equilibrium level) and large output contractions. Similarly, Guidotti, Sturzenneger and 
Villar (2003) find evidence that liability dollarization worsens output recovery after a 
sudden stop in capital inflows.    Céspedes (2004) finds that the interaction of real devaluation 
and external debt has a significant negative effect on output. 
It is easier to point out the problem of “mismatch” -- between the currency of 
denomination of a country’s debts and the currency that its firms earn -- than it is to 
identify a remedy or even a cause.   It is not enough to instruct firms to avoid dollar debts 
or to hedge them, because international investors are not very interested in lending to 
these countries in their own currencies.   The result of following a rule to avoid 
borrowing in foreign currency would thus be to borrow less in total (which admittedly 
might not be such a bad outcome).    Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) have made the 
inability to borrow in local currencies famous under the name “original sin.”  The phrase 
is meant to imply that the problem is not the fault of the countries themselves, or at least 
not the fault of recent governments.  But we need not accept that it is completely pre-
determined.
29 
                                                                                                                                                 
Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2002), Dornbusch (2002), Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2005), 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krugman (1999), Mendoza (2002), and Schneider and Aaron 
Tornell (2001).  
29   One school of thought is that the choice of an adjustable peg regime, or other 
intermediate exchange rate regime, leads to dangerously high unhedged foreign-currency 
borrowing.  It is argued that a floating regime would force borrowers to confront the 
existence of exchange rate risk, and thereby reduce unhedged foreign-currency borrowing 
(e.g., Eichengreen, 1999, p. 105).     This sounds like an argument that governments   24 
 
4. How Might Debtors Mitigate Contractionary Currency Crashes? 
One need not dismiss the charge that international financial markets discriminate 
against developing countries in a number of ways in order to discuss respects in which 
debtors have some responsibility for their own fate.   Let us consider two.  One respect is 
short-run, and one is long-run. 
 
4.1 Shifts on the balance sheet during the “procrastination phase” 
The short-run question over which countries have some control arises during the 
interval that I have called the period of procrastination.   When foreign investors lose 
their previous enthusiasm for financing a country’s current account deficit, the national 
policy makers must decide whether to adjust, or to wait.   Typically they wait.  Countries 
that had previously managed to keep dollar-denominated debt relatively low, tend to 
switch the composition of their debt in that direction during the year or so preceding the 
ultimate currency crash, in order to entice skeptical foreign investors to stay in. 
A prime example is Mexico during the course of 1994.    International enthusiasm 
for investing in Mexico began to decline after the beginning of the year.  The authorities 
clung to the exchange rate target and delayed adjustment, in the hopes circumstances 
would turn around.   Most obviously, during much of the year they ran down reserves, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
should introduce gratuitous volatility, because private financial agents underestimate risk.   
But the models of Chamon and Hausmann (2005), Chang and Velasco (2004), Jeanne 
(2005), and Pathak and Tirole (2004) point to this advantage of floating, with only 
fundamentals-generated uncertainty and rational expectations.   Hausmann and Panizza 
(2003) find empirical support only for an effect of country size on original sin, not for an 
effect of income level or exchange rate regime.  Goldstein and Turner (2004) point out 
things countries can do to reduce currency mismatch.   25 
shown in Figure 4.   But an important second mechanism of delay was to placate nervous 
investors by offering them tesobonos (short-term dollar linked bonds) in place of the peso 
bonds (Cetes) that they had previously held.    Figure 5 shows the dramatic increase in 
dollar-linked debt during the year leading up to the peso crisis of December 1994.   It 
seems likely that the magnitude of the Mexican recession in 1995 stemmed, not just from 
the adverse balance sheet effects that have been so frequently noted, but particularly from 
the adverse shift in balance sheets that took place during the course of 1994.  A third 
mechanism of delay was a shift toward shorter maturities, illustrated in Figure 6.
30   And 
the fourth has already been noted, an explicit commitment to defend the peg.  
These mechanisms are part of a strategy that is sometimes called “gambling for 
resurrection.”  What they have in common, beyond achieving the desired delay, is 
helping to make the crisis worse when it does come, if it comes.
31   It is harder to restore 
confidence after a devaluation if reserves are near zero and the ministers have lost 
personal credibility.   Further, if the composition of the debt has shifted toward the short 
term, in maturity, and toward the dollar, in denomination, then restoring external balance 
is likely to wreak havoc with private balance sheets regardless the combination of 
increases in interest rate versus increases in exchange rate. 
The lesson?  Adjust sooner rather than later (which is admittedly easier said than 
done). 
                                                 
30  E.g., Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2004). 
31 This helps explain why the ratio of short-term foreign debt to reserves appears most so 
often and so robustly in the literature on early warning indicators for currency crashes.  
Examples include Berg, Borensztein, Milesi-Ferreti, and Pattillo (1999), Frankel and 
Rose (1996), Frankel and Wei (2005, Table 2), Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart  
(2000), Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha (2002), Rodrik and Velasco (2000), and many other 
references given in those papers.   26 
 
4.2 Openness to trade reduces vulnerability to currency crises 
One final question concerns an aspect of the structure of the economy that can be 
influenced by policy but only in the long-run:  the degree of integration with respect to 
international trade. Broadly speaking, there are two opposing views on the relationship 
between  a  country’s  openness  and  whether  it  is  prone  to  sudden  stops  or  currency 
crashes. The first view is that openness makes a country more vulnerable to sudden stops. 
A country highly integrated into world markets is more exposed to shocks coming from 
abroad. The second view is that countries that are open to international trade are less 
vulnerable to sudden stops. If the ratio of trade to GDP is structurally high, it is easier to 
adjust to a cut-off in international financing of a given magnitude. I will describe a new 
test of the relationship between trade openness and vulnerability to sudden stops to help 
choose  between  the  two  hypotheses.  Such  tests  have  been  done  before,  but  usually 
without  taking  into  account  the  possible  endogeneity  of  trade.  The  incremental 
contribution here is to use the gravity instrument for trade openness -- which aggregates 
geographically-determined bilateral trade across a country’s partners -- to correct for the 
possible endogeneity of trade. 
The view that trade openness makes countries more vulnerable to crises comes in 
a number of forms.  One variant is that a weakening in a country’s export markets is 
sometimes the trigger for a sudden stop in capital flows, so that a high-trade country is 
more vulnerable. Another variant notes that sudden stops in finance often extend to a loss 
in trade credit -- especially for imports, but sometimes also even for exports -- and that 
the resulting shrinkage in trade is more painful if trade was a larger share of the economy   27 
to begin with. A third variant says that financial openness raises vulnerability to sudden 
stops, and openness to trade in practice goes hand in hand with openness to financial 
flows.
32 In the limiting case, a country that is in autarky with respect to trade must have a 
net  capital  account  of  zero  owing  to  the  balance  of  payments  adding-up  constraint. 
Regardless  the  specific  reasoning,  the  notion  that  globalization  leads  to  crises  is  a 
generalization that appeals to many. 
The view that openness to trade makes countries less vulnerable also comes with 
a  number  of  different  specific  mechanisms  that  have  been  proposed.      Eaton  and 
Gersovitz  (1981)  and  Rose  (2002)  argue  that  the  threatened  penalty  of  lost  trade  is 
precisely  the  answer  to  the  riddle  “why  do  countries  so  seldom  default  on  their 
international  debts?”    Strong  trade  links  are  statistically  correlated  with  low  default 
probabilities. International investors will be less likely to pull out of a country with a high 
trade/GDP ratio, because they know the country is less likely to default. A higher ratio of 
trade is a form of “giving hostages” that makes a lending cutoff less likely.  
Another variant of the argument that openness reduces vulnerability takes as the 
relevant  penalty  in  a  crisis  the  domestic  cost  of  adjustment,  i.e.,  the  difficulty  of 
eliminating a newly-unfinanceable trade deficit. The argument goes back at least to Sachs 
(1985, p.548).  He suggested that Asian countries had been less vulnerable to dislocations 
than  Latin American countries in the international debt crisis of the 1980s -- despite 
similar debt/GDP ratios -- because they had higher export/GDP ratios. The relatively 
worse performance observed in Latin America was due to the lower availability of export 
                                                 
32 For example because much trade needs multinational corporations, who in turn need to 
be able to move money across national borders; or because it is harder to enforce capital 
controls if trade is free. Aizenman (2003), and Aizenman and Noy (2004).   28 
revenue to service debt. More recently, Guidotti et. al. (2004) make a similar point by 
providing evidence that economies that trade more recover fairly quickly from the output 
contraction that usually comes with the sudden stop, while countries that are more closed 
suffer sharper output contraction and a slower recovery.  
Consider first a country that faces a given cut-off in financing, and must adjust 
without  nominal  or  real  exchange  rate  flexibility.  The  adjustment  must  then  come 
through  a  reduction  in  spending.  To  achieve  a  $1  billion  improvement  in  the  trade 
balance, the contraction has to be $ (1/m) billion, where m is defined as the marginal 
propensity  to  import  (in  a  Keynesian  model)  or  the  share  of  spending  that  falls  on 
tradable goods (in a tradable/nontradable model). The lower is m, the more painful the 
adjustment. Whether output itself falls depends, of course, primarily on whether wages 
and  prices  are  flexible.  But  even  in  a  full-employment  world,  sharp  reductions  in 
consumption are not enjoyable. 
Consider,  second,  a  country  that  does  have  the  option  of  nominal  and  real 
exchange rate flexibility. In traditional textbook models, if the adjustment is achieved in 
part through nominal and real depreciation, rather than exclusively through expenditure-
reduction, the country can accommodate the tougher new financing constraint without 
necessarily suffering a recession. This is true even if a relatively large devaluation is 
required  to  generate  the  necessary  improvement  in  the  trade  balance.  But  since  the 
emerging  market  crises  of  1994-1998,  as  we  have  already  noted,  economists  have 
increasingly emphasized the contractionary balance sheet effect: if the country’s debts are 
denominated  in  foreign  currency,  the  balance  sheets  of  the  indebted  banks  and 
corporations are hit in proportion to the devaluation.  If the economy is starting from a   29 
high ratio of trade to GDP the necessary devaluation need not be large, and therefore the 
adverse balance sheet effect need not be large. But if the economy is not very open to 
trade to begin with, the necessary devaluation, and the resulting balance sheet impact and 
recession,  will  all  be  large.  Again  we  arrive  at  the  result  that  whether  the  necessary 
adjustment will be large and painful depends inversely on openness. 
The balance sheet version of the openness story is modeled formally by Calvo, 
Izquierdo,  and  Talvi  (2003)  and  Cavallo  (2004).  Both  have  in  mind  the  example  of 
Argentina, which has traditionally had a low ratio of trade to GDP, and has suffered some 
of the worst sudden stops.
33  But the hypothesis that openness to trade reduces a country’s 
vulnerability to sudden stops transcends any one formal model, causal link, or country 
example. The same is true of the opposing hypothesis, that openness raises a country’s 
vulnerability.    It  would  be  useful  to  be  able  to  choose  empirically  between  the  two 
competing hypotheses. 
I will report new results -- from Cavallo and Frankel (2004) -- for two questions.   
(1) What is the effect of openness on vulnerability to “sudden stops”  implemented by a 
probit model measuring the probability of a sudden reduction in the magnitude of net 
capital inflows, following closely the definition of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004)? 
34 
(2) What is the effect of openness on vulnerability to “currency crises,”  implemented by 
a  probit  model  representing  the  probability  of  a  sudden  increase  in  exchange  market 
                                                 
33  Others who have argued that Argentina’s low trade/GDP ratio helps explain why it 
was such a victim of the global sudden stop after 1999 include Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Mejia (2003), Calvo and Talvi (2004), Desai and Mitra (2004) and Treasury Secretary 
Paul O’Neill, who once reportedly said it was unsurprising the Argentines had lost the 
confidence of investors because they don’t export anything. 
34 To the best of my knowledge, the increasingly popular expression “Sudden Stops” was first used by 
Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995). The first analytic approach to the problem of sudden stops is 
Calvo (1998).    30 
pressure, which is in turn defined as the percentage depreciation plus percentage loss in 
foreign exchange reserves? In addition to analyzing the probit model of this exchange 
market pressure definition of a currency crisis, as in Frankel and Wei (2005) we also 
looked at the output loss subsequent to a crisis.     
There  is  no  reason,  a  priori,  why  something  (openness)  that  makes  the 
consequences  of  sudden  stops  better  (less  contractionary  devaluations)  should  also 
necessarily make them less frequent.   Or that something that makes the consequences 
worse should also make them more frequent.  Indeed some theories are based on the 
notion that the worse the consequences, the less often it will happen.  But in our results 
the effects turn out to go the same way, regardless which concept of performance is used. 
Calvo,  Izquierdo  and  Mejía  (2004)  and  Edwards  (2004a,  b)  are  among  the 
empirical papers that find that openness to trade is associated with fewer sudden stops. 
On  the  other  hand,  Milesi-Ferretti  and  Razin  (1998,  2000)  find  that  openness  helps 
trigger crises and/or sharp reversals of the current account.  Most of these papers use the 
trade/GDP ratio as the measure for openness to trade. 
A critic might argue that the trade/GDP ratio is endogenous. One way in which 
trade  openness  could  be  endogenous  is  via  income:  countries  tend  to  liberalize  trade 
barriers as they grow richer -- in part because their mode of public finance gradually 
shifts  from  tariff  revenue  to  income  or  VAT  taxes.    A  second  way  is  that  trade 
liberalization could be part of a more general reform strategy driven by pro-globalization 
philosophy or “Washington Consensus” forces. Other aspects of such a reform program, 
such as privatization, financial liberalization, or macroeconomic stabilization might affect 
the  probability  of  crises,  and  yet  an  OLS  regression  analysis  might  inappropriately   31 
attribute the effect to trade. A third way that trade openness could be endogenous is that 
experience with crises -- the dependent variable -- may itself cause liberalization, via an 
IMF program. Or it might have the opposite effect, if a country’s response to a crash is 
disenchantment with globalization and the Washington Consensus.   A fourth way in 
which trade openness could be endogenous is through the feedbacks between trade and 
financial openness. 
How  can  the  endogeneity  of  trade  be  addressed? We  use  gravity  estimates  to 
construct  an  instrumental  variable  for  trade  openness,  the  methodology  developed  by 
Frankel and Romer (1999), in the context of the effect of trade on growth, and updated in 
the Frankel and Rose (2002) dataset.      
The  results  reported  in  Table  2  show  that  openness  reduces  vulnerability  to 
sudden stops rather than increasing it.
35   Not only does this relationship hold up when we 
move from OLS to instrumental variables, but it appears stronger.  The degree of trade 
openness  is  a  powerful  predictor  of  these  capital  account  shocks:  moving  from 
Argentina’s current trade share (approximately .20 of GDP) to Australia’s average trade 
share (approximately .30 of GDP), reduces the probability of a sudden stop by 32%.   The 
results for openness are the same when  we seek to explain currency crashes.  Trade 
protectionism  does  not  “shield”  countries  from  the  volatility  of  world  markets  as 
proponents might hope. On the contrary, less trade openness leads to greater vulnerability 
to sudden stops and currency crashes.  In fact out of the set of controls we tried, openness 
is the only variable that is virtually always statistically significant.
36    
                                                 
35 A more complete set of results is reported in Cavallo and Frankel (2004). 
36 The current account deficit as a share of GDP is always highly significant in the probit 
regressions to determine sudden stops, and liability dollarization is sometimes; but not in   32 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
There are thus at least two ways of seeking to minimize vulnerability to sudden 
stops, devaluations, and associated economic contractions: keeping the economy open to 
trade, and keeping balance sheets strong by avoiding a shift to short-term dollar debt as a 
means of procrastination., and keeping the economy open to trade.   TWe began this 
lecture began by noting the frequency with which political leaders and ministers lose 
office after a devaluation.  But seeking to hold on to political viability is presumably the 
precise reason why governments often procrastinate, why they feel they have to postpone 
adjustment to balance of payments deficits, and instead run down reserves, shorten the 
maturity of the debt, and borrow in dollars.   So the openness strategy may be the most 
robust option, politically as well as economically. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the currency crash equation.    The reserve/import ratio is always highly significant in the 
currency crash regression, and sometimes foreign debt/GDP and nominal exchange rate 
rigidity, but not so in the first equation. 
 
   33 
Figure 1a.  Attaining Internal and External Balance: Traditional Version 
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Figure 1b.  Attaining Internal and External Balance: When Devaluation is Contractionary 
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Table 1:  Determination of Passthrough to Imported Goods Prices:  
Developing Countries, Relative to Rich Countries (76 countries,1990-2001) 
 
Source:  Frankel, Parsley, and Wei (20054).  
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The 8 import commodities (given with their country of origin) are: Marlboro Cigarettes (US), Coca-cola 
(US), Cognac (France), Gilbey’s gin (US), Time magazine (US), Kodak Color Film (US), Cointreau 
































Source: Frankel, Parsley, andWei (2004) – effect within one year, in 76 countries. 
Note::    Passthrough is greatest for prices of imports at dock, but less for retail and CPI 







































Source: Frankel, Parsley & Wei (2004) – Prices for 8 narrowly defined commodities 
imported into 76 countries; effect of exchange rate change within one year. 
 
Note: Passthrough for less developed countries is greater than for rich countries, 
historically. 
 
Figure 3: Pass-through and Income 
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Figure 4. Evolution of Mexico’s Reserves, from Sudden Stop to 1994 Currency Crash 
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Figure 5. Evolution of Mexican Debt According to Currency Denomination, 1992-95 
 
 Source: Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 
 
Figure 6. Evolution of Mexican Debt According to Maturity, 1992-95 
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Table 2:  
Effect of openness (trade/GDP) on vulnerability to sudden stops and currency crashes   
 
Source: Cavallo and Frankel (2004) 
 
  To predict sudden stops 
(Calvo et al definition) 
To predict currency crashes 
(Frankel & Wei, 20054 definition) 
 
  Ordinary probit  IV  Ordinary probit  IV 
 






























CA/GDP t-1  -4.068    
(1.297)** 
-7.386   
 (2.06)*** 




ln Reserves in Months 




Constant  -2.544    
(0.63)*** 
-1.73   
 (0.723)** 




Obs.  778  1062  557  841 
         
 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10% 
Estimation performed with regional dummies and year fixed effects. 
IV is the gravity-based instrumental variable for trade openness from Frankel-Romer (1999) and Frankel-Rose (2002). 
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Appendix 1.  Currency Crashes and Frequency of Changes of 




A.     Change in Premier or Chief Executive:  One-Year Horizon, 1970–2003 
 
      P-value for the difference is 0.126. 
 
 
Graph of number of episodes of devaluations and number of premier changes over time 
Developing Countries – Six-month period 
 
 
Note: The correlation between the two series is 18.1 percent. 
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Total  188  3,314 
Number of currency crash episodes and premier changes across the world 


















































































































































































Devaluation episode   48 
 
 
B.     Change in Premier or Chief Executive:  One-Year Horizon, 1970–2003 
 
Note: “Own turnover” — The reference set is only those developing countries that have 
experienced a currency crash at some point.  P-value for the difference is 0.0133. 
 
 
C.  Change in Premier or Chief Executive:  Six-Month Horizon, 1970–2003 
 




D.   Change in Premier or Chief Executive:  Six-Month Horizon, 1970-2003 
 
 
Note: “Own turnover” – reference set is only for those developing countries which have 
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Total  141  2,142 
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E.  Change in Finance Minister or Central Bank Governor:  One-year horizon. 
 
 
Note: The data pertain to the IMF Board of Governors Membership from 1995–1999, 
inclusive.  The probability of the IMF governor of a country changing is 1.63 times larger 
when there was a currency crash.  T-statistic is 3.56.  P-value is 0.001.   
 
F.  One-Year Horizon, Change in Premier or Chief Executive by Income Level 
 
(1) Rich Countries 
 
 
(2) Middle-Income Countries 
Note: P-value for the difference is 0.3419. 
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(3) Poor Countries 




G. Six-Month Horizon, Change in Premier or Chief Executive by Income Level 
 
(1) Rich Countries 
 
 
(2) Middle Income Countries 
Note: P-value for the difference is 0.0224. 
 
(3) Poor Countries 
Note: P-value for the difference is 0.1740. 
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H. Changes in Leadership According to Political System 
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I.  Change In Premier, Controlling for Start of an IMF Program (Within 3 Months 
on Either Side of a Currency Crash) 
 




The t-test below compares the probability that devaluation leads to a premier change within 
six months when there is an IMF program (21 percent) with the probability of a premier 
change occurring within six months (in general).   The P-value is much larger, at 20 percent.  
 
 
                 
       Ha: diff < 0      Ha: diff = 0      Ha: diff > 0 
        t =  –0.8781      t =  –0.8781      t =  –0.8781 




Comparing IMF and non-IMF devaluation cases, and the probability with which 
each leads to a change of leader within six months, shows that there is no significant 
difference between the two groups. 
 
 
Ha: diff < 0      Ha: diff= 0      Ha: diff > 0 
t =   0.0803      t =   0.0803      t =   0.0803 





  Premier Change 
Occurred Within 6 
months 
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Occur Within 6 months 
Total 










Cases without an 
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When comparing the probability that devaluation without an IMF program leads to a change 
of leader within six months with the probability of premier change occurring within six 




Ha: diff < 0      Ha: diff = 0      Ha: diff > 0 
t =  –1.901      t =  –1.901      t =  –1.901 
P < t =   0.031      P > |t| =   0.061    P > t =   0.969 
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Appendix 2 : IMF country programs, with dates of approval  
 
country  begin  appryr  comamt  drawnamt  Comments 
ALBANIA  Stand-By  8/26/1992  20  13.12 
Cancelled prior to expiration date 8/25/93.  
Replaced by ESAF on 7/14/1993. 
ALGERIA  Stand-By  6/3/1991  300  225   
ALGERIA  Stand-By  5/27/1994  457.2  385.2  Cancelled. 
ALGERIA  EFF  5/22/1995  1169.28  1169.28   
ARGENTINA  Stand-By  7/29/1991  780  292.5  Cancelled prior to expiration date of 6/30/92. 
ARGENTINA  EFF  3/31/1992  4020.25  4020.25 
Extended from 3/30/95 to 4/30/95 and then  
to 3/30/96. Approved amount increased. 
ARGENTINA  Stand-By  4/12/1996  720  613   
ARGENTINA  EFF  2/4/1998  2080  0 
At time of approval, purchase schedule  
decided through 11/98. 
ARGENTINA  Stand-By  3/10/2000  10585.5  3834.3   
ARMENIA  Stand-By  6/28/1995  43.88  13.5  Cancelled prior to expiration of 6/27/96. 
AZERBAIJAN  Stand-By  11/17/1995  58.5  58.5   
AZERBAIJAN  EFF  12/20/1996  58.5  53.24  Extended from 12/19/99 to 3/19/2000. 
BELARUS  Stand-By  9/12/1995  196.28  50   
BRAZIL  Stand-By  1/29/1992  1500  127.5   
BRAZIL  Stand-By  12/2/1998  10419.84  7869.15  Amounts exclude SRF drawing of SDR 2.6 b. 
BRAZIL  Stand-By  9/14/2001  2193  0   
BULGARIA  Stand-By  3/15/1991  279  279  Followed by another stand-by on 4/17/1992. 
BULGARIA  Stand-By  4/17/1992  155  124  Approved after expiration of 3/15/91 stand-by. 
BULGARIA  Stand-By  4/11/1994  139.48  116.24  Approved amount increased in 9/94. 
BULGARIA  Stand-By  7/19/1996  400  80 
Cancelled prior to expiration date of 3/18/98.  
Replaced by another stand-by on 4/11/97. 
BULGARIA  Stand-By  4/11/1997  371.9  371.9  Replaced the 6/19/96 stand-by. 
BULGARIA  EFF  9/25/1998  627.62  523   
CAMEROON  Stand-By  12/20/1991  28  8   
CAMEROON  Stand-By  3/14/1994  81.06  21.91  Followed by another stand-by on 9/27/95. 
CAMEROON  Stand-By  9/27/1995  67.6  28.2  Approved after expiration of 3/14/94 stand-by. 
CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC  Stand-By  3/28/1994  16.48  10.71   
CHAD  Stand-By  3/23/1994  16.52  10.32   
COLOMBIA  EFF  12/20/1999  1957  0   
CONGO, REP OF  Stand-By  8/27/1990  27.98  4   
CONGO, REP OF  Stand-By  5/27/1994  23.16  12.5   
COSTA RICA  Stand-By  4/8/1991  33.64  25.64  Extended from 4/7/92. 
COSTA RICA  Stand-By  4/19/1993  21.04  0   
COSTA RICA  Stand-By  11/29/1995  52  0   
COTE D' IVOIRE  Stand-By  9/20/1991  82.75  33.1   
CROATIA  Stand-By  10/14/1994  65.4  13.08   
CROATIA  EFF  3/12/1997  353.16  28.78   
CROATIA  Stand-By  3/19/2001  200  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
CZECH REPUBLIC  Stand-By  3/17/1993  177  70   
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  Stand-By  1/7/1991  619.5  619.5 
Extended from 3/6/92.  
Followed by another stand-by  4/3/92. 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  Stand-By  4/3/1992  236  36 
Cancelled prior to expiration date  4/2/93 
 (Czechoslovakia ceased to exist on 1/1/93). 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  Stand-By  8/28/1991  39.24  39.24  Followed by another stand-by on 7/9/1993. 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  Stand-By  7/9/1993  31.8  16.8   
ECUADOR  Stand-By  12/11/1991  75  18.56   
ECUADOR  Stand-By  5/11/1994  173.9  98.9 
Approved amount increased in 11/94.  
Cancelled prior to expiration date 3/31/96. 
ECUADOR  Stand-By  4/19/2000  226.73  113.35   
EGYPT  Stand-By  5/17/1991  234.4  147.2  Extended from 11/30/92 . 
EGYPT  EFF  9/20/1993  400  0   
EGYPT  Stand-By  10/11/1996  271.4  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
EL SALVADOR  Stand-By  8/27/1990  35.6  0   
EL SALVADOR  Stand-By  1/6/1992  41.5  0  Followed by another stand-by  5/10/93.   55 
EL SALVADOR  Stand-By  5/10/1993  47.11  0 
Approved after expiration of 1/6/92 stand-by.   
Extended from 3/9/94. Amount increased 11/94. 
EL SALVADOR  Stand-By  7/21/1995  37.68  0   
EL SALVADOR  Stand-By  2/28/1997  37.68  0  Extended from 4/27/98. 
EL SALVADOR  Stand-By  9/23/1998  37.68  0   
ESTONIA  Stand-By  9/16/1992  27.9  27.9  Followed by another stand-by 10/27/93. 
ESTONIA  Stand-By  10/27/1993  11.63  11.63 
Approved after expiration of 9/16/92 stand-by.  
Followed by another stand-by on 4/11/95. 
ESTONIA  Stand-By  4/11/1995  13.95  0 
Approved after expiration of 10/27/93 stand-by.  
Followed by another stand-by on 7/29/1996. 
ESTONIA  Stand-By  7/29/1996  13.95  0  Approved after expiration of 4/11/95 stand-by. 
ESTONIA  Stand-By  12/17/1997  16.1  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
ESTONIA  Stand-By  3/1/2000  29.34  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
GABON  Stand-By  9/30/1991  28  4   
GABON  Stand-By  3/30/1994  38.6  38.6   
GABON  EFF  11/8/1995  110.3  60.67  Extended from 11/7/98 to 3/7/99. 
GABON  Stand-By  10/23/2000  92.58  13.22   
GEORGIA  Stand-By  6/28/1995  72.15  22.2  Cancelled prior to expiration date  6/27/96. 
GUATEMALA  Stand-By  12/18/1992  54  0   
HAITI  Stand-By  3/8/1995  20  16.4   
HONDURAS  Stand-By  7/27/1990  30.5  30.5  Extended from 7/26/91. 
HUNGARY  Stand-By  3/14/1990  159.21  127.37  Cancelled prior to expiration date 3/13/1991 
HUNGARY  EFF  2/20/1991  1114  557.23  Cancelled prior to expiration date 2/19/94. 
HUNGARY  Stand-By  9/15/1993  340  56.7   
HUNGARY  Stand-By  3/15/1996  264.18  0   
INDIA  Stand-By  1/18/1991  551.93  551.93   
INDIA  Stand-By  10/31/1991  1656  1656   
INDONESIA  Stand-By  11/5/1997  8338.24  3669.12 
Approved under Fund' s emergency procedures.  
Access increased 7/15/98. Cancelled prior to 
 expiration date 11/4/2000. 
INDONESIA  EFF  8/25/1998  5383.1  3797.7 
Prior SBA cancelled, replaced by EFF.   
EFF to cover remaining period of SBA 
Cancelled before expiration date 11/5/00, 
replaced by EFF on 2/4/00. 
INDONESIA  EFF  2/4/2000  3638  851.15   
JAMAICA  Stand-By  3/23/1990  82  82  Followed by another stand-by on 6/28/91. 
JAMAICA  Stand-By  6/28/1991  43.65  43.65  Extended from 6/30/92. 
JAMAICA  EFF  12/11/1992  109.13  86.75  Extended from 12/10/95 to 2/24/96 and  3/16/96. 
JORDAN  Stand-By  2/26/1992  44.4  44.4  Extended from 8/25/93. 
JORDAN  EFF  5/25/1994  189.3  130.32 
Approved amount increased in 9/94 and  2/95. 
 Cancelled prior to expiration date 5/24/1997.  
Replaced by another EFF  2/9/96. 
JORDAN  EFF  2/9/1996  238.04  202.52  Approved amount increased from 200.8 in 2/97. 
JORDAN  EFF  4/15/1999  127.88  36.54   
KAZAKHSTAN  Stand-By  1/26/1994  123.75  74.25 
Extended from 1/25/95.  
Followed by another stand-by  6/5/95. 
KAZAKHSTAN  Stand-By  6/5/1995  185.6  185.6  Approved after expiration of 1/26/94 stand-by. 
KAZAKHSTAN  EFF  7/17/1996  309.4  154.7   
KAZAKHSTAN  EFF  12/13/1999  329.1  0   
KOREA  Stand-By  12/4/1997  15500  14412.5  Approved under Fund' s emergency procedures. 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC  Stand-By  5/12/1993  27.09  11.61   
LATVIA  Stand-By  9/14/1992  54.9  54.9  Followed by another stand-by on 12/15/93. 
LATVIA  Stand-By  12/15/1993  22.88  9.15 
Approved after expiration of 9/14/92 stand-by.  
Followed by another stand-by on 4/21/1995. 
LATVIA  Stand-By  4/21/1995  27.45  0 
Approved after expiration of 12/15/93 stand-by.  
Followed by another stand-by on 5/24/96. 
LATVIA  Stand-By  5/24/1996  30  0 
Approved after expiration of 4/21/95.  
Followed by another stand-by on 10/10/1997. 
LATVIA  Stand-By  10/10/1997  33  0 
Approved after expiration of 5/24/96 stand-by. 
 Precautionary arrangement. 
LATVIA  Stand-By  12/10/1999  33  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
LATVIA  Stand-By  4/20/2001  33  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
LESOTHO  Stand-By  9/23/1994  8.37  0  Cancelled. Replaced by another stand-by 7/31/95.   56 
LESOTHO  Stand-By  7/31/1995  7.17  0 
Approved after expiration of 9/23/94 stand-by. 
 Followed by another stand-by on 9/23/96. 
LESOTHO  Stand-By  9/23/1996  7.17  0  Approved after expiration of 7/31/95 stand-by. 
LITHUANIA  Stand-By  10/21/1992  56.93  56.93  Followed by another stand-by on 10/22/93. 
LITHUANIA  Stand-By  10/22/1993  25.88  5.18 
Approved after expiration of 10/21/92 stand-by.  
Cancelled prior to expiration date of 3/21/95. 
LITHUANIA  EFF  10/24/1994  134.55  134.55   
LITHUANIA  Stand-By  3/8/2000  61.8  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
LITHUANIA  Stand-By  8/30/2001  86.52  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
MACEDONIA (FYR)  Stand-By  5/5/1995  22.3  22.3   
MACEDONIA (FYR)  EFF  11/29/2000  24.115  1.15   
MALAWI  Stand-By  11/16/1994  15  12.72   
MEXICO  Stand-By  2/1/1995  12070.2  8758.02 
Extended from 8/15/96.  Initial amount  
approved  2/1/95 and increased 6/30/95. 
MEXICO  Stand-By  7/7/1999  3103  1939.5   
MOLDOVA  Stand-By  12/17/1993  51.75  51.75  Followed by another stand-by on 3/22/95. 
MOLDOVA  Stand-By  3/22/1995  58.5  32.4  Approved after expiration of 12/17/93 stand-by. 
MOLDOVA  EFF  5/20/1996  135  87.5   
MONGOLIA  Stand-By  10/4/1991  22.5  13.75  Extended from 10/3/92. 
MOROCCO  Stand-By  7/20/1990  100  48   
MOROCCO  Stand-By  1/31/1992  91.98  18.4   
NICARAGUA  Stand-By  9/18/1991  40.86  17.03   
NIGER  Stand-By  3/4/1994  18.6  11.1   
NIGERIA  Stand-By  1/9/1991  319  0   
NIGERIA  Stand-By  8/4/2000  788.94  0   
PAKISTAN  Stand-By  9/16/1993  265.4  88 
Cancelled prior to expiration date  9/15/1994. 
Replaced by an EFF/ESAF in 2/94. 
PAKISTAN  EFF  2/22/1994  379.1  123.2 
EFF and parallel ESAF replaced by a  
stand-by approved by Board 12/13/95.  
Three purchases made under  EFF. 
Cancelled on 12/13/95 prior to expiration. 
PAKISTAN  Stand-By  12/13/1995  562.59  294.69 
Extended from 3/31/97.  
Amount increased 12/17/96. 
PAKISTAN  EFF  10/20/1997  454.92  113.74  This EFF approved along with an ESAF. 
PAKISTAN  Stand-By  11/29/2000  465  150   
PANAMA  Stand-By  2/24/1992  74.17  54.57 
Extended from 12/23/93. Amount  
decreased from 93.68 in 12/93. 
PANAMA  Stand-By  11/29/1995  84.3  84.3  Approved amount increased from 69.8. 
PANAMA  EFF  12/10/1997  120  40   
PANAMA  Stand-By  6/30/2000  64  0   
PERU  EFF  3/18/1993  1018  642.69  This arrangement  followed by another EFF 7/1/96. 
PERU  EFF  7/1/1996  300.2  160.5  Approved amount increased  
PERU  EFF  6/24/1999  383  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
PERU  Stand-By  3/12/2001  128  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
PHILIPPINES  Stand-By  2/20/1991  334.2  334.2 
Extended from 8/19/92 to 12/31/92 and 3/31/93.  
Amount includes augmentation of 70. 
PHILIPPINES  EFF  6/24/1994  791.2  791.2 
Arrangement extended from 6/23/97 to 7/23/97, 
12/31/97 and  3/31/98. Access increased 7/18/97.   
Followed by another Stand-by on 4/1/98. 
PHILIPPINES  Stand-By  4/1/1998  1020.79  545.66 
Approved after expiration of 6/2494 EFF.  
Extended from 3/31/2000 to 6/30/2000.  
Then extended to 12/31/00. 
POLAND  Stand-By  2/5/1990  545  357.5   
POLAND  EFF  4/18/1991  1224  76.5  Cancelled prior to expiration date of 4/17/94. 
POLAND  Stand-By  3/8/1993  476  357  Extended from 3/7/94. 
POLAND  Stand-By  8/5/1994  333.3  283.3 
Approved amount increased in 10/94,  
then decreased to 333.3 in 9/95. 
ROMANIA  Stand-By  4/11/1991  380.5  318.1  Followed by another stand-by on 5/29/92. 
ROMANIA  Stand-By  5/29/1992  314.04  261.7  Approved after expiration of 4/11/91 stand-by. 
ROMANIA  Stand-By  5/11/1994  320.5  94.27 
Extended from 12/10/95 and cancelled prior  
to expiration date 4/24/97.  
Replaced by another stand-by 4/22/97. 
ROMANIA  Stand-By  4/22/1997  301.5  120.6  Replaced the 5/11/94 stand-by. 
ROMANIA  Stand-By  8/5/1999  400  139.75  Extended from 3/31/2000 to 5/31/2000.    57 
Then extended to 2/28/2001. 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  Stand-By  8/5/1992  719  719   
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  Stand-By  4/11/1995  4313.1  4313.1  Cancelled prior to expiration date 4/10/96. 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  EFF  3/26/1996  13206.57  5779.71 
Arrangement terminated on 3/26/99  
prior to 3/25/2000 end date 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  Stand-By  7/28/1999  3300  471.43   
SENEGAL  Stand-By  3/2/1994  47.56  30.91  Cancelled prior to expiration date 3/1/95. 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  Stand-By  7/22/1994  115.8  32.15   
SRI LANKA  Stand-By  4/20/2001  200  103.35  Precautionary arrangement. 
TAJIKISTAN  Stand-By  5/8/1996  15  15   
THAILAND  Stand-By  8/20/1997  2900  2500   
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO  Stand-By  4/20/1990  85  85  Approved after expiration of 1/13/89 stand-by. 
TURKEY  Stand-By  7/8/1994  610.5  460.5  Extended from 9/7/95. Amount increased 4/95. 
TURKEY  Stand-By  12/22/1999  8676  2843.8   
UKRAINE  Stand-By  4/7/1995  997.3  538.65  Followed by another stand-by on 5/10/96. 
UKRAINE  Stand-By  5/10/1996  598.2  598.2 
Approved after expiration of 4/7/95 stand-by.  
Extended from 2/9/97. 
UKRAINE  Stand-By  8/25/1997  398.92  181.33   
UKRAINE  EFF  9/4/1998  1919.95  712.15 
Approved amount increased 5/27/1999.  
Arrangement extended to 8/15/2002. 
URUGUAY  Stand-By  12/12/1990  94.8  9   
URUGUAY  Stand-By  7/1/1992  50  15.97   
URUGUAY  Stand-By  3/1/1996  100  0  Followed by another stand-by on 6/20/97. 
URUGUAY  Stand-By  6/20/1997  125  114.2  Approved after expiration of 5/1/96 stand-by. 
URUGUAY  Stand-By  3/29/1999  70  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
URUGUAY  Stand-By  5/31/2000  150  0  Precautionary arrangement. 
VENEZUELA  Stand-By  7/12/1996  975.65  350 
Only one purchase made as BOP position  
strengthened, creating pressure on public  
spending and sending program off track. 
VIETNAM  Stand-By  10/6/1993  145  108.8 
Cancelled prior to extended date 12/31/94 
 (original date was 10/5/94). 
ZIMBABWE  EFF  1/24/1992  340.8  71.2  EFF cancelled prior expiration date 1/23/1995. 
ZIMBABWE  EFF  9/11/1992  114.6  86.9   
ZIMBABWE  Stand-By  6/1/1998  130.65  39.2   
ZIMBABWE  Stand-By  8/2/1999  141.36  24.74   
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Appendix 3 (1-year horizon):  
In a sample of currency crashes, chief executives were 1.7 times as likely to lose their 
jobs over the subsequent 12 months if their government had said it would not 
devalue (2/3) as if it had not said so (7/18). 
 
 
A. Promises by Premiers, Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors 
 




2) Background Table 1 (Changes in Premier) 




Presence of Promise 
(by whom) 
Newspaper 
(Date of Report) 
Argentina  03/75  03/24/75  No  La Prensa 
Argentina  04/81  12/11/81  No  La Prensa 
Argentina  04/89  07/08/89  Yes  (CB Governor)  La Prensa (03/31/89)
 1) 
Argentina  01/02  01/02/02  Yes (Premier)
   La Prensa (12/27/01)
 2) 
Korea  12/97  02/25/98  No  Maeil Business Daily 
Mexico  09/76  12/01/76  No  El Excelsior 
Mexico  02/82  12/01/82  Yes (Premier & CB governor)  El Universal (02/06/82)
 3) 
Lebanon  08/90  12/24/90  No  Al Hayat 
Sierra 
Leone  08/97  03/10/98  No  Sierra Leone News 
Venezuela  02/02  04/13/02  Yes (CB governor)  El Diario (02/08/02)
 4) 
Syria  01/88  11/01/ 88  No  Al Ba’ath 
 
1) Central Bank Governor Jose Machinea denied yesterday that modifications to the exchange rate markets 
are under study and announced a monetary policy tightening through a strong increase in the interest 
rates in order to stop the increase of the dollar. 
2) We don’t want to be slaves, said the president (Alberto Rodriguez Saa) during an effusive speech at the 
CGT. There he made transcendental announcements that there will be neither devaluation nor 
dollarization; and that there will be a new third currency, the “argentinian,” backed by the governmental 
real estate. 
3) In a vibrant announcement the president(Jose Lopez Portillo+ 
-o) pointed out the most important aspects of the strategy to follow…The peso will keep floating and to 
compensate for its floating path it has been set compensatory tariff and license system. Romero Kolbeck 
(Banco de Mexico director) denied the rumor of a devaluation, the peso will keep floating… “There is no 
chance for a devaluation for our currency and therefore the floating scheme will keep going, said 
Gustavo Romero Kolbeck.  If these rumors were true, that a devaluation is being structured then I 
wouldn’t be here right now” said a smiling Romero Kolbeck.  The famous quotation by Presidentthat 
Lopez Portillo that he would “defend the peso like a dog” was made in a state of the union address in 
August 1981, a year before the devaluation, and did not receive the newspaper attention 
  Changes 
in Premier 
No Changes 
 in Premier 




Promise  4  2  2/3  6 
No Promise  7  11  7/18  18 
Total  11  13    24   59 
contemporaneously that it received ex post. reported in the newspaper; it may have been made more than 
a month earlier. 
4) Castellanos (president Central Bank of Venezuela) claimed that the decision of the government to 
address the fiscal problem of the country and develop other public initiatives will allow the exchange 
rate policy to keep defending the Bolivar. 
 
 
3) Background Table 2 (No Changes in Premier) 




Presence of Promise 
(by whom) 
Newspaper 
(Date of Report) 
Chile  07/71  09/11/73  No  El Mercurio 
Chile  03/75  03/11/90  No  El Mercurio 
Chile  07/85  03/11/90  No  El Mercurio 
Kenya  04/93  12/30/02  Yes (Finance Minister)
   Daily Nation (03/23/93)
 1) 
Lebanon  01/85  06/01/87  No  Al Anwar 
Nigeria  10/86  08/26/93  No  Daily Times 
Nigeria  03/92  08/26/93  No  Daily Times 
Peru  06/76  07/28/80  No  El Comercio 
Peru  12/87  07/28/90  Yes (Finance Minister)
   El Comercio (11/27/87)
 2) 
Uganda  06/81  07/27/85  No  Uganda Times 
Uruguay  03/72  07/13/76  No  El Dia 
Uruguay  11/82  02/12/85  No  El Dia 
Zambia   10/85  11/02/91  No  Zambia Daily Mail 
 
1) The Kenyan government went back to forex control. It rejected all IMF rules; Finance Minister Musalia 
Mudavadi said that Kenyan economy could no longer absorb further devaluation of the shilling.   
(Nonetheless, devaluation occurred on April 21
st ). 
2)  Saberbein (Minister of the economy and finance) said that the devaluation would be progressive next 
year. The exchange rate or the price of dollar would move along with wholesale prices during the next 
year as a clear export-supporting policy, for the aim is keep growing fostering external sector.  (Despite 












  Changes  
in Premier 
No Changes  
in Premier 




Promise  2  0  2/2  2 
No 
Promise  9  13  9/22  22 
Total  11  13    24   60 
Appendix 4 (half-year horizon):  
In a sample of currency crashes, chief executives were more than twice as likely to 
lose their jobs over the subsequent 6 months if their government had said it would 
not devalue (1/2) as if it had not said so (2/9). 
 
 













  Changes 
in Premier 
No Changes 
 in Premier 




Promise  3  3  1/2  6 
No Promise  4  14  2/9  18 
Total  7  17    24 
  Changes  
in Premier 
No Changes  
in Premier 




Promise  1  1  1/2  2 
No 
Promise  6  16  6/22  22 
Total  7  17    24 